


AIR WAR COLLEGE

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“ON THE ROAD TO AWESOMENESS”:  
A CULTURAL CHANGE FOR THE  
US ARMY RESERVE



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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

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## **Biography**

Colonel John J. Perrel is an Army Reserve Logistics Officer assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. COL Perrel received a direct commission in January 1990. He most recently served as the Deputy Chief of Staff - G1, 412th Engineer Command in Vicksburg, MS. He has commanded at every level from Detachment to Brigade. COL Perrel was activated as a transportation platoon leader during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and as a transportation company commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom. COL Perrel's area of concentration (AOC) is in simulation operations, functional area (FA) 57, and he has served with the 75th Training Division as an observer controller (OC) and an exercise operations officer.



## **Abstract**

Over the last 16 years the Army Reserve has cemented its role as an operational force, required by the Army to meet the wartime mission. However, as the pace of mobilizations and deployments slows, the Army Reserve must overcome several challenges to remain an operational force. Mobilizations enabled Soldiers and units to achieve readiness standards, while deployments gave Soldiers the real world experience. Now, the Army Reserve is at a crossroads. In order to stay relevant in today's complex environment, they must veer off their current course and move rapidly down a new road in order to change the culture of the organization. The forcing function for this cultural change is an Annual Deployment model that establishes a sense of urgency, maintains experience levels, and holds leaders at every level accountable for results. However, cultural change does not come easily. Training management must be placed center stage to remove training distractions and focus on Soldier readiness, unit readiness, and operational experience. Cultural change requires building a coalition of key players, each passionate about obtaining the goal. First Army, 84th Training Division, and the Operational and Functional Commands are these key players. As the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) welcomes a new commander, Lieutenant General Charles D. Luckey, now is the time for this change. In fact, he is already communicating his vision of the Army Reserve. He is working to re-brand the Army Reserve as an operationally ready force that is "on the Road to Awesomeness."

## Introduction

A Sustainment Brigade worked feverishly to execute the Annual Training (AT) plan throughout the year, ensuring their twenty units were ready to attend eight different exercises. As they arrive at their Warrior Exercise (WAREX) AT, they are not as prepared to execute the mission scenario as they should be. The Battle Assemblies leading up to the AT were focused on completing numerous administrative and Soldier readiness requirements. They knew that they were not the primary training audience for the WAREX and believed they had enough experience to work through any problems that arose. However, two assigned units did not show up, two others did not bring all of their required equipment, and one did not have their command team present. Additionally, one of the units could not complete assigned missions due to a lack of licensed operators, while another did not have enough personnel present to complete missions and support base security. The brigade's lack of preparation made them situationally unaware of the pending issues they would face. The Training Command quickly and effectively made scenario adjustments in order to give every unit the best possible experience. At the conclusion of the exercise, everyone went home feeling like the exercise was a success because they conducted training.<sup>1</sup>

This story is not from the 1980 strategic Army Reserve, but from a 2015 after action review of the operational Army Reserve. The same organization that played a vital support role in two wars over the last 15 years by mobilizing over 310,000 Soldiers.<sup>2</sup> With 40% of the warfighting enablers in the reserve component, it is easily understood why the Army Reserve was transformed from a strategic force to an operational force. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley,<sup>3</sup> the previous Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Commission on the Future of the Army<sup>4</sup> have stated before Congress the need for the reserve component to remain

an operational force due to reductions in the active Army's strength and the current fiscal restraints. The issue at hand however, as the story portrays, is how to maintain the Army Reserve as an operational force.

The Army Reserve is at a crossroads. To stay relevant in today's complex environment, they must veer off their current course and move rapidly down a new road that will change the culture of the organization. The Army Reserve became operational by focusing on the mobilization process. The process, which involved both pre-mobilization and post-mobilization activities, created the three keys to being an operational force: Soldiers readiness, unit readiness, and a depth of experience. Mobilizations created a sub-culture that met these three requirements but is now disappearing with reduced deployments. If the Army Reserve doesn't make strategic cultural changes now they could be operationally ineffective in less than 5 years due to attrition and promotions. The Army Reserve must immediately change its culture through the use of an Annual Deployment model because it will focus unit actions on training management and resource allocation. This strategy will enable the Army Reserve to maintain operational capabilities by increasing Soldier readiness, improving unit readiness, and deepening the level operational experience. This cultural change will develop Soldiers and leaders ready to carry the Army Reserve into the next generation. By following the Annual Deployment model, the Army Reserve can steer through the crossroads and drive down Lieutenant General Luckey's "road to awesomeness."<sup>5</sup>

## **Background**

Department of Defense Directive 1200.17 issued in 2008 mandated managing the Reserve Component as an operational force. For clarity, the Army Reserve is not charged with maintaining its entire force as an operational force. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed

the Army Reserve to “provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements.”<sup>6</sup> Army Reserve Soldiers are divided into three areas: always available, operationally rotating, and generating forces. There are 40,000 Soldiers in the support and training commands that make up the Army Reserve generating force. The always available force consists of 15,000 Soldiers in units that are required to maintain their operational readiness every year. The last group of 135,000 Soldiers rotate with their units through the Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM). SRM divides the forces into a 5-year rotation (see figure 1) with approximately 27,000 Soldiers in each year. Units within the first two years provide strategic depth, while units in years three and four provide operational depth. Units that rotate to the fifth year of the cycle, the operational force year, have reached level three readiness capabilities.<sup>7</sup> A level three capable (C3) force indicates that the unit possesses the personnel, equipment, and experience “to accomplish or provide many, but not all, of the core functions.”<sup>8</sup> The operational unit’s C3 readiness allows them to rapidly complete their training during post mobilization and deploy within 90 days.<sup>9</sup> Combining the always ready and the operational fifth year forces gives the Army an available 42,000 Soldier operational reserve force. As stated earlier, the problem for the Army Reserve is maintaining an operationally ready force during periods of reduced mobilizations. The answer is to change the Army Reserve culture.




Figure 1

Culture is defined “as a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group.... which has worked well enough to be considered valid,” and is therefore “taught to new members as the correct way.”<sup>10</sup> In other words, culture is the underlying value that causes a group of individuals to act a certain way. Culture will affect how Soldiers wear their uniform, cut their hair and even how they interact with superiors. They do not understand why, it is just what they do. In the absence of leadership, the group experience, whether rational or irrational, becomes the value. Good leadership, however, will affect culture by establishing what is proper or important. Although value statements and creeds are valuable reinforcement mechanisms, a leader establishes culture by what they pay attention to, measure, and allocate resources toward. They also create culture through the actions they model and the actions they reward and punish.<sup>11</sup>

Lieutenant General Luckey is currently attempting to change the culture of the Army Reserve by bringing energy and effectively communicating his guidance. He states that a “Big Shift” needs to take place in order for the organization to adapt to changing conditions. “We must now shift our focus, drive our cultural ethos, and develop our capabilities,” because “where we are going is not where we have been.”<sup>12</sup> This is an excellent leadership technique as he focuses everyone’s attention to the future, changing the culture while moving down the road to awesomeness. All of his words are calls to action. The Army Reserve needs action in Soldier readiness, unit readiness and operational experience.

## **Soldier Readiness**

Soldier readiness is the foundational requirement for the Army Reserve to meet their mission. It is a key strategic indicator that is monitored at every command level and it is safe to say that this topic garners more attention and resources than any other issue. However, Soldier readiness numbers indicate that there is a cultural crisis that must be addressed. There are over

3,100 (25%) Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Soldiers that are currently non-deployable.<sup>13</sup>

Over 44,000 (24%) Soldiers are not medically ready. Additionally, over 45,000 (24%) Soldiers are not qualified in their duty military occupational specialty (DMOSQ) and over 61,000 (35%) Soldiers have not met their physical readiness requirements.<sup>14</sup> The culture has allowed Soldiers to stop being Soldiers. In other words, they are not ensuring their own personal readiness.

Assessing the current cultures in self-development, institutional training, and leader development will create a clearer picture concerning the crisis.

The Army defines self-development as well planned and goal oriented learning, resulting in the Soldier obtaining knowledge, self-awareness, and situational awareness.<sup>15</sup> The Soldier's creed states "I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills."<sup>16</sup> For the Reserve Soldier this self-development training is completed on the Soldier's own time. Previously mentioned indicators, such as 1 in 3 Soldiers cannot pass the fitness test, while 1 in 4 are not medically ready, do not portray a culture that understands or executes self-development. Some say that the old culture of the Army Reserve working one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer still exists. The culture must change to a lifestyle of Soldier preparation; every day, always ready. LTG Luckey declares "this life is not for everyone." Soldiers must be prepared to "fight tonight."<sup>17</sup> This cultural shift is key to meeting the Army Reserve goal for operational readiness because it ensures the base knowledge and ability of each Soldier. The goal is for Soldiers to arrive at battle assembly (BA) trained, ready to be tested and to refine their self-developed skills.

Institutional training is an imperative for Soldier readiness. This is the foundational training Soldiers need in order to excel at their jobs as they progress through their careers. As stated previously, 1 in 4 Soldiers are not trained in the duty they are to perform. Additionally,

35% of E-6s have not completed their required Advanced Leadership Course (ALC) and 26% of the E-7s have not completed the required Senior Leader Course (SLC).<sup>18</sup> Officer statistics are worse with 44% of all O-3s not completing the Captains Career Course and 55% of the O-4s not completing their Intermediate Level Education.<sup>19</sup> The Army Reserve's current culture allows the Soldier to choose when they attend training while permitting Soldiers to perform work without proper training. The Army Reserve must change this culture and start ordering Soldiers to the first available school. Thoroughly knowledgeable Soldiers, created through institutional training, will ensure Soldiers are confident and capable to perform their mission. This in turn will allow for better training management and result in more highly productive Soldiers and units which is exactly the culture the Army Reserve is striving to create.

The final Soldier readiness issue concerns leadership. LTG Luckey states that "this (leadership) is the game changer." "The only way we will succeed is through leaders who set the example, are competent, selfless, and hold themselves and their subordinates accountable."<sup>20</sup> In contrast to this statement, one senior officer stated the single greatest flaw in the Army Reserve is "the culture of senior leaders accepting less than Army standard."<sup>21</sup> The readiness numbers mentioned above would appear to bear this statement out as true. MG Benenati, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), weighs in on leadership stating "today's Battalion Commanders and Command Sergeants Major have grown up in this 'feed me' environment of the last 12 years, and now need to be taught how to do things for themselves."<sup>22</sup> LTG Talley, former USARC commander, affirmed this thought when he wrote "our core competencies have atrophied. Leader development and training management were hardest hit."<sup>23</sup> The Army Reserve must change its culture to ensure leadership is taught, coached and mentored,

but also that leaders are held accountable. The goal of improving leadership “contributes fundamentally to our #1 priority of maximizing unit readiness.”<sup>24</sup>

The lack of Soldier readiness literally kills unit training management. The Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Soldier spends a great deal of time managing Soldier readiness instead of unit readiness issues. The money is already available to ensure required training is completed, however the expectations and accountability must be increased. When the Army Reserve culture demands self-development, institutional training, and responsible leadership, then the Army Reserve will become more operationally ready and can focus on unit readiness.

### **Unit Readiness**

LTG Luckey needs fully ready units in order to meet his “fight tonight” initiative.<sup>25</sup> Army Regulation 220-1 states that unit readiness is the assessment of four measured areas: personnel, supplies on hand, equipment readiness, and training proficiency.<sup>26</sup> Any failure in the first three areas directly affect the unit’s training capability. Supply and equipment readiness must be attained between battle assemblies, just like the personnel readiness described above, in order to effectively conduct unit training. Training proficiency is an assessment of the unit’s ability to perform their mission essential tasks (MET) to standard. Ideally, battle assembly training activities take Soldier skills and build unit training readiness. However, the 84th Training Command, during WAREX 78-14, reported that 69% of the units arriving at annual training had initial assessments that did not meet readiness standards. The 84th’s final assessment of these units indicated that 27% demonstrated improvement that met standard, but that 42% remained below standard.<sup>27</sup> This statistic would indicate that the Army Reserve has a cultural training issue. The Army Reserve must change this culture by improving training management, training to standard, and conducting rigorous home station training.

Unit training management is certainly an art and not a science. Training management is the ability of each leader to understand the mission, assess the current state, and envision the required future state. Leaders must then develop and execute a plan to attain the future state. Training management is an art because no two commanders will have the exact same assessment or vision even though they have the same mission. To assist leaders the Army has created the online Army Training Network which provides leaders with tools to craft their training program. However, despite this resource, the Army Reserve obtains the poor training results mentioned above. Many have said that the culture does not protect training plans or training time. Mr. Rick Fink, 1A G3 Training, states that units are often more focused on administrative tasks instead of training during battle assembly weekends.<sup>28</sup> MG Luckey concurs and addresses this issue by demanding leaders to “unencumber subordinate commanders from administrative requirements.”<sup>29</sup> Although this addresses a portion of the problem, it is still incumbent on leaders to prepare their units for the mission. The example above states that four out of every ten units still did not meet training standards after two weeks of training. MG Tracy Thompson, Commander of the 412th Engineer Command, states that training management skills have “atrophied” and that he sees “leaders squandering a great deal of our limited training time.”<sup>30</sup> Training management is certainly about protecting the unit’s training time, but it also requires leaders to selectively choose tasks that will enhance the unit’s ability to complete the mission and then train those tasks to standard.

Training to standard is executing training to a predetermined task, condition, and standard. These standards are found in the Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EO) located in the Army Training Network. The outlines provide all necessary information to train to standard. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0 states the Army conducts “standards based,

performance-oriented training.”<sup>31</sup> Performance-oriented means the training is tested to ensure the standard is fully met. It is repetitious, “hands-on, and experiential” training.<sup>32</sup> The Army Reserve current culture is one that takes short cuts, doesn’t train to standard, and doesn’t complete home station performance testing. MG Benenati said that during the annual training exercise Arctic Lightning 2015, there were units whose home station training did not enable them to perform tasks to standard. He elaborates further “it was obvious that there were units who had not received preparation assistance or over watch from their peacetime higher headquarters.”<sup>33</sup> Mr. Fink agrees, but attributes the training shortfall to units simply not using the training and evaluation outlines to properly prepare to standard.<sup>34</sup> Training management requires leaders to allocate time and resources for training, rehearsals, and then performance evaluation. Verifying the Soldier’s, team’s, and unit’s performance will build their confidence and will then require more rigorous training to challenge them.

Operationally ready units must conduct rigorous, battle focused home station unit training. This type of training replicates an operational environment and challenges Soldiers both intellectually and physically with the goal of achieving initiative and adaptability.<sup>35</sup> Realistic training is getting out of the classroom and into the field. It ensures Soldiers have the proper equipment, experience, and confidence to accomplish missions in a complex world. Army Reserve units attending annual training arrive without having cold weather, wet weather, or personal protective equipment. This level of unpreparedness demonstrates their lack of rigorous home station training. The 84th Training Command noted that units do not embrace the importance of cold weather exercises. They report that because the unit’s training has not developed confidence in their skills, they “are too quick to seek weather related reasons to not conduct their missions.”<sup>36</sup> Additionally, rigorous training is about improving Leader and Soldier

adaptability. MG Benenati commented that he “noticed several symptoms of basic troop leading procedure shortfalls” while attending an exercise.<sup>37</sup> These skills should have been learned at the Soldier readiness level and deeply engrained during the unit readiness training. The culture of the Army Reserve must change to focus on rigorous home station training that prepares Soldiers and units, not only for their next annual training mission, but ensures they are ready when their nation calls.

Unit readiness is one of the keys to maintaining the Army Reserve as an operationally ready force. The current culture focuses too much on administrative requirements and does not place enough emphasis and accountability on unit training. Every unit must seek to improve their readiness through an increased focus on training management, training to standard, and conducting rigorous home station training. When this happens, the Army Reserve will be on the road to awesomeness. However, to be ready to “fight tonight” they will need to gain a deeper operational experience through annual training exercises.

### **Operational Experience**

The Army Reserve mission is to provide trained, equipped, and ready Soldiers, Leaders, and Units. Although this is true, the one element that is missing is experience. The joint learning continuum declares that it takes individual preparation, collective (unit) preparation, and experience to validate mission readiness.<sup>38</sup> The active Army sends their Soldiers to one of the Combat Training Centers (CTC) to give them that experience. The 84th Training Command is the executing agent for the Army Reserve Combat Support Training Program (CSTP) which trains 54,000 Soldiers each year through annual training exercises.<sup>39</sup> Reserve Soldiers gain some experience with home station training through field training exercises, but depend on their annual training to gain the bulk of their battlefield experience. The current culture of the Army Reserve

though does not maximize the unit's annual training experience. MG Benenati states that the current annual training system is not meeting the needs for the Army Reserve of the future. Units show up unprepared, expecting to be trained instead of arriving fully prepared anticipating to be tested by a rigorous training program.<sup>40</sup> The Army Reserve will be more operationally ready when they change the culture of the Combat Support Training Program (CSTP) experience through standardized training objectives, improved realistic missions, and increased performance accountability. This strategy will focus training, create greater learning opportunities, and validate the unit is ready to progress in the SRM cycle.

The commander's training objectives are the key drivers of a unit training program. However, the current annual training program allows these same objectives to drive annual training as well. Although the training command develops a scenario, commanders have a say in their training. COL(R) James Danna, former commander of the 191st Infantry Brigade, states it makes the exercises highly inefficient. He describes some exercises as "a loose organization of disparate units arriving on one central location, all pursuing different training objectives."<sup>41</sup> The 84th Training Command related that units are not training properly for the scenario. There are units arriving at the exercise without a "working knowledge of the base order."<sup>42</sup> Commanders that do not know the base order cannot develop good training objectives. This is a cultural process issue that needs to be resolved. Army Reserve commands often hold their yearly training briefs (YTB), which approve the unit's yearly training calendars (YTC), months before the unit starts planning their annual training. Units fail to reassess their training plans in light of the annual training mission. By using standardized training objectives, like ones used in post-mobilization training, the training command can ensure every unit is focused on the correct tasks. This will also allow the training commands to improve the realism of the training.

Realistic and challenging training missions are key to cementing the learning experience for the unit. “Units and Soldiers thrive on complex, dynamic, challenging and realistic training that is well planned and well led.”<sup>43</sup> Realistic training incorporates environment, infrastructure, threat, different units and mission into a seamless scenario that challenges every echelon, from the individual Soldier up to the brigade. Realistic training provides units with a greater training opportunity than they have available at home station. Currently scenarios, however, are often based on conducting convoys that don’t serve a purpose or defending forward operating bases (FOB) that can’t realistically be defended. MG Benenati agrees that the scenarios “do not provide significant, realistic work”. When there is work, it is “not enough for a single PLS platoon, let alone the entire company.” The FTX portions “do not stress nor test” the unit’s capability and need to “increase in depth, frequency, complexity and realism.”<sup>44</sup> This is a poor statement considering these exercises happen several times a year and are planned a year in advance. The training culture of the Army Reserve must change to meet LTG Luckey’s vision to be “the most capable, combat ready and lethal force in the history of the Nation.”<sup>45</sup> Units will not have the requisite experience without realistic training.

The last point concerning operational experience is an increase in performance accountability. Army training, as mentioned above, is always performance oriented. Soldiers and leaders need external evaluation to fully understand how they performed in relation to the standard. The Army Reserve command training guidance states “the lack of objective task evaluation criteria allows for overconfidence in task proficiency, a false impression of unit capability, and creates the impression that attending a training event equates to being trained.”<sup>46</sup> MG Benenati agrees with the idea of performance accountability. He states that there “is a need to establish formalized gates that a unit must successfully achieve prior to moving to subsequent

years in the sustainment readiness model.”<sup>47</sup> Additionally, COL Danna and others believe that for the annual training program to change, the Operational and Functional Commands must be held accountable for their units training before and during the exercises.<sup>48</sup> LTG Luckey’s “Big Shift” initiative states that if the Army Reserve is going to adapt to the changing environment, leaders must “hold themselves and their subordinates accountable.”<sup>49</sup> Performance accountability is the test at the end of a yearlong training program. A test where the unit already knows the answers, but is challenged to perform to standard. Performance accountability ensures the Army Reserve is not promoting a culture where training equates to being trained!

Culture. Not everyone agrees that the Army Reserve has a cultural crisis issue. However, consider the statistic that only one of the twenty major subordinate commands meets medical readiness standards.<sup>50</sup> It could be that the Army Reserve is facing the worst medical crisis in the U.S. since the 1918 influenza epidemic. Or it could be that commanders have a total disregard for meeting Army standards. But the most likely answer is that the Army Reserve has a cultural problem that demands immediate attention. John Kotter, noted cultural change author, writes that to change culture requires establishing a sense of urgency, creating a guiding coalition, developing vision and strategy, and communicating the vision.<sup>51</sup> LTG Luckey is actively and effectively working the last three of the tasks. The first task however, will require a significant forcing function to create the required sense of urgency. The forcing function can be obtained by adopting an annual deployment model.

### **Annual Deployment Model**

“Training a unit does not fundamentally differ from preparing a unit for an operation. Reinforcing the concepts, ideas, and terminology of the operations process while training as a unit makes a more seamless transition from training to operations.”<sup>52</sup> FM 7-0

The Annual Deployment (AD) model establishes an end-to-end program that creates training focus, improves training management, and provides performance feedback. Training focus is provided through the early establishment of mission requirements and creates the vision for the entire cycle. Training management while at home station is improved through the establishment of milestones and the increased accountability and involvement of the peace time chains of command. Performance feedback happens throughout the process but is finalized at a realistic scenario driven exercise. The good news is that this model already exists. The Annual Deployment model follows the same mobilization process used over the last 16 years.

Notification of Sourcing (NOS) is created by the collective training scheduling workshop (CTSW) and sent by the Training Command to each unit in the fourth quarter, approximately 22 months out. Units are assigned with their BN and even BDE, if possible, to create continuity of effort, assist in the evaluation process and reduce expense. Robust company attendance at conferences, teleconferences, etc. is not required because battalions are already engaged. The CSTW fills each training center's standardized task organization with regional units first in order to reduce expenses in manpower and material movement. The NOS contains a mission statement with clearly defined capability requirements, which allows commanders to assess mission essential tasks (MET) and additional unique Soldier training requirements in preparation for the Joint Assessment Conference.

The Joint Assessment Conference (JAC) is conducted by the regional training command (lead) and First Army (support) in the 1<sup>st</sup> quarter, approximately 19 months out. It will function as the initial planning conference (IPC). The JAC lays out the road to war, conducts leader refresher training, reviews the commander's assessment and designs a single integrated training plan (SITP). The SITP is a unit's roadmap (horse blanket) to guide individual and home station

training. The JAC also schedules known home station training shortfalls for the first few days of the AD. Additionally, the JAC identifies equipment shortfalls the unit's chain of command will track throughout the year. Units leaving the JAC know the exact standards they must meet to perform well at the AD exercise. The JAC information feeds directly into each unit's yearly training brief.

Yearly Training Briefs (YTB) are conducted by each unit's chain of command in the second quarter, approximately 16 months out. The YTB validates the single integrated training plan and approves the risk for required training not performed. Individual training (self-development, institutional, and leader) requirements must be addressed to ensure collective goals are met. The YTB ensures the training is realistic and performance oriented, to include field training exercises (FTX). The YTB is a contract between the commanders and is considered a mission type order. Violating the YTBs execution of training is a serious offense. The YTB ensures milestones for achievement are created and that all data is entered into the Digital Training Management System (DTMS). DTMS is the Army's validation system of record as the training phase begins.

The training phase is executed twelve months out by each unit with assistance from First Army and oversight by the COC. First Army assistance includes training management and external evaluation support. Unit training meetings communicate requirements, allowing for the preparation of Soldiers, equipment and supplies between battle assemblies. Training is realistic and performance oriented with minimal classroom instruction. Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EO) are used for rehearsing, training to standard, and testing. Additionally, the training is iterative to deepen the experience and to build confidence. The COC will guard training time, minimizing distractions. The unit records all training results in DTMS. The COC monitors

training monthly using DTMS to ensure milestones are met and the unit is prepared for the AD exercise.

The Annual Deployment exercise is a culminating training event (CTE) which evaluates the unit's ability and validates their position in the SRM. The 84th Training Division develops and drives the scenario. First Army, 75th Training Division, and the Operational & Functional Commands assist the 84th with the scenario. The scenario is standardized, reducing cost by using it at each of the Reserve Training Centers, thereby allowing units to train regionally. A standardized scenario also requires a standardized task organization which increases logistical planning and prepositioning capabilities. Scenarios are realistic and complex in nature, challenging Leaders and Soldiers to draw on the depths of their learning. The exercises are designed with multiple iterations, each with changing variables, which allow units to improve skills and gain a greater depth of experience. The scenarios are based on realistic missions that have consequences, allowing units to taste success and failure. The AD exercise allots time at the end of the exercise for the commander and his evaluators to formally review the T&EO's assessed. The assessment is a supporting document to every leader's evaluation as a testament to obtaining or failing to obtain their year-long endeavor.

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Army Reserve units will easily adopt the Annual Deployment model. It is a system that many have moved through several times over the last 16 years. The model focuses their training activities and creates a priority of effort. However, some may say that because of this easy transition, it will not drive the cultural change that is needed. Others might contend that cultural change could happen without changing to this model. Both are certainly true! The model is not a

panacea, it still requires a guiding leadership coalition, as well as the development and communication of the vision. However, the Annual Deployment model does call up historical images that focus everyone's attention on the deployment mission. Soldiers prepare themselves and every team pursues the mission together. This is what the model brings to the operational reserve fight: the mind set of focused training in preparation to heading off to a real world mission.

The adoption of the Annual Deployment model demands much more from senior leadership and the Major Subordinate Commands (MSC). This model will force leaders to accept a greater risk on administrative requirements as they seek to protect invaluable training time the single integrated training plan will require. This is the cornerstone issue that will build cultural change. Additionally, as LTG Luckey pointed out, this life of rigorous training is not for everyone and leadership must prepare for the fall out, as some may need to leave the ranks. The Training Commands also face a large challenge as they seek to develop a standardized scenario that increases the depth, complexity, and realism of the training exercise. This can only be done as they develop a closer working relationship and support from the other major subordinate commands. These commands will also find the cultural change difficult as they seek to hold themselves and their subordinates responsible for the end to end training results of the Annual Deployment model.

## **Conclusion**

The Army needs the Army Reserve to maintain itself as an operational reserve force, capable of supporting missions within ninety days. The Army Reserve, through frequent mobilizations and deployments, has become operational. However, this capability is slipping away due to decreased operational tempo. In order to maintain operational capabilities, the Army

Reserve leadership must change the culture of the organization in the areas of Soldier readiness, unit readiness, and operational experience. The adoption of the annual deployment model will become a forcing function that creates a focused, yearlong effort in these three critical areas and produces quantifiable results that demonstrate the unit's readiness level and capabilities. Cultural changes include redefining what it means to be a Soldier, conducting rigorous performance oriented home station training, and executing experience deepening exercises. For the cultural changes to take place, senior leadership needs to understand their role. They must embrace the changes while effectively communicating them and holding subordinates accountable for them. Currently, the Army Reserve is at the operational reserve crossroads. LTG Luckey must drive the Army Reserve down the road to cultural change. If he does, the Army Reserve will be on the road to awesomeness.

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